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This contribution deals with recent developments in sexual 
offences against children with reference to sections in the 
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act 32 of 2007. This Act is addressed against the 
backdrop of the Constitutional Court judgments in Teddybear 
Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and J v National Director of Public Prosecutions. 
These two judgments had a profound impact on the shaping of 
the newly formulated sexual offences in line with constitutional 
principles, ultimately culminating in the enactment and 
commencement of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and 
Related Matters) Amendment Act 5 of 2015. The approach by 
the Constitutional Court in both of these judgments is discussed 
and assessed. An analysis is provided of the Amendment Act 
with specific reference to its impact on sexual offences against 
children. 
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1 Introduction 
If our job is to protect our children, why in the heck would we want to make 
them sex offenders for the rest of their lives?1 
Sexual offences against children have undergone radical reform since the 
advent of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.2 The Constitution 
formally commenced on 4 February 1997. As with all other areas of law, it 
had a profound impact on the field of the criminal law, and more specifically 
within the ambit of sexual offences. Prior to the constitutional dispensation, 
sexual offences were partly catered for statutorily in terms of the previous 
Sexual Offences Act (SOA).3 The offences of rape and indecent assault 
were common law offences.4 The SOA provided for sexual offences against 
children, although the scope of the offences provided for was limited. With 
the birth of the Constitution giving rise to a human rights culture which 
ultimately changed the face of all fields of law, sexual offences in general 
as well as sexual offences against children were revisited. The advent of 
the Constitution undoubtedly played a pivotal role in the far-reaching 
transformation of the criminal law pertaining to sexual offences, eventually 
giving rise to the enactment and commencement the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act (SORMA).5 The Act 
repealed various common law crimes including rape and indecent assault, 
replacing them with statutory crimes and also providing for a gender neutral 
definition and scope for the crime of rape.6 
One of the most prominent advancements in terms of the Act relates to a 
cluster of sexual offences against children.7 The preamble of the Act 
                                            
* Philip Stevens. LLB, LLM, LLD (UP). Senior Lecturer, Department of Public Law, 
Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, South Africa. Email: Philip.Stevens@up.ac.za. 
1  Magaw, as quoted in Stone 2011 DePaul L Rev 1169. 
2  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 
“Constitution”). 
3  Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the "SOA"). Also see in 
general Snyman Criminal Law (2002) 362-365; Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 
(2005) 699 pertaining to the position in terms of the SOA. 
4  See Snyman Criminal Law (2014) 436, 445-452; Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 
(2013) 699-727; 734-740. 
5  Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). The Act effectively commenced on 16 December 
2007. 
6  Snyman Criminal Law (2014) 341; Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (2013) 599-611; 
Smythe, Pithey and Artz Sexual Offences 13. 
7  See ch 3 of the Act. The specific sexual offences against children provided for in the 
Act are contained in ss 15-22 and include acts of consensual sexual penetration with 
certain children (s 15); acts of consensual sexual violation with certain children (s 16); 
the sexual exploitation of children (s 17); the sexual grooming of children (s 18); the 
exposure or display or causing the display or exposure of child pornography to children 
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specifically underscores the vulnerability of children and mentally disabled 
persons and pertinently states that the expansion of the offences "aims to 
address the particular vulnerability of children and persons who are mentally 
disabled in respect of sexual abuse and exploitation". The Act further 
provides for the establishment of a National Register of Sex Offenders.8 The 
aim of the establishment of the Register is to establish a record of persons 
who have been convicted of sexual offences against children and against 
persons who are mentally disabled in order to prohibit such persons from 
being employed in a manner that places them in a position to work with or 
have access to or authority over children or persons who are mentally 
disabled. The Register accordingly seeks to protect specifically two of the 
most vulnerable groups of persons. Chapter 6 of SORMA provides for 
comprehensive procedures with reference to the Register and allows for 
employers, licensing authorities and authorities dealing with fostering 
kinship, care-giving, adoption and curatorship to apply for a certificate 
stating whether or not the particulars of a potential employee or applicant 
are contained in the Register. 
Despite the fact that the Act was drafted within the climate of a constitutional 
dispensation with the aim of promoting the values enshrined in the 
Constitution, certain provisions were recently challenged on a constitutional 
basis. These provisions were specifically sections 15 and 16 dealing with 
consensual sexual penetration and violation between adolescents, as well 
as the provisions in the Act relating to the Register pertaining to juvenile sex 
offenders. 
In this contribution, recent developments in sexual offences against children 
with reference to the latter provisions will be addressed against the 
backdrop of the Constitutional Court judgments in Teddybear Clinic for 
Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development9 and 
                                            
(s 19); using children for or benefiting from child pornography (s 20); compelling or 
causing children to witness sexual offences, sexual acts or self-masturbation (s 21); 
and exposure to or the display of, or causing of exposure to or the display of the genital 
organs, anus or female breast to children (s 22). The Act thus provides for a wide 
scope of sexual offences against children, underscoring the particular vulnerability of 
children in society. For the purposes of the current contribution, emphasis will be 
placed on ss 15 and 16 of the Act. 
8  See ch 6 of the Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Register"). For the purposes of this 
contribution, only the most important aspects of the Register will be addressed with 
specific reference to children and accordingly juvenile offenders. 
9  Teddybear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Constitutional Development 2014 
2 SA 168 (CC) (hereinafter referred to as "Teddybear 2"). Also see the judgment by 
the North Gauteng High Court under Teddy Bear Clinic for the Abused Children v 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2013 ZAGPPHC 1 (4 January 
2013) (hereinafter referred to as "Teddybear 1"). 
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J v National Director of Public Prosecutions.10 These two judgments had a 
profound impact in terms of shaping newly formulated sexual offences in 
line with constitutional principles, culminating in the enactment and 
commencement of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act.11 Finally an analysis of the Amendment Act will be 
provided with reference to its impact on sexual offences against children. It 
is accordingly essential first to take a closer look at these two important 
judgments by the Constitutional Court, after which an assessment and 
discussion will be provided. 
2 Constitutional challenges to section 15 and 16 of the 
Act 
2.1 Sections 15 and 16 prior to the Amendment Act 
It is interesting to note that the initial aim behind the Act during its inception 
was to deal specifically with sexual offences against children.12 It was later 
decided, however, that the Act should provide for all sexual offences, 
including sexual offences against adults.13 Sections 15 and 16 are of 
particular importance for the present discussion pertaining to the recent 
developments in sexual offences against children.14 Section 15 pertains to 
consensual sexual penetration of children, also more commonly referred to 
as "statutory rape", and criminalises acts of consensual sexual penetration 
with children.15 Section 16 relates to consensual sexual violation with 
children and is also commonly referred to as statutory sexual assault, 
criminalising acts of consensual sexual violation with children.16 It is also 
necessary for the purpose of clarity to note that "Child" is defined in section 
1(1) of the Act as follows: 
(a) a person under the age of 18 years; or 
                                            
10  J v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2014 ZACC 13 (6 May 2014) (hereinafter 
referred to as "J v NDPP"). Also see the judgment in the High Court S v IJ 2013 2 
SACR 599 (WCC) (hereinafter referred to as “S v IJ”). 
11  Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 5 of 2015 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Amendment Act"). The Amendment Act formally 
commenced on 7 July 2015. 
12  Smythe, Pithey and Artz Sexual Offences V. 
13  Smythe, Pithey and Artz Sexual Offences V. 
14  In terms of the position prior to 2007, when the Act commenced, sexual offences 
against children were regulated in terms of the framework provided for in s 14 of the 
SOA. See Snyman Criminal Law (2014) 362-365. 
15  See s 15 of the Act. 
16  See s 16 of the Act. 
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(b) with reference to sections 15 and 16, a person 12 years or older but 
under the age of 16 years, and 'children' has a corresponding meaning. 
Accordingly, for the purposes of sections 15 and 16 a child is a person of 
the age of 12, 13, 14 or 15 years, and the phrases "consensual sexual 
penetration" and "consensual sexual violation" of a child therefore refer to a 
child in the age group of 12 to 15 years.17 
Section 57(1) provides that a child below the age of 12 years is incapable 
of consenting to any sexual act. In addition, a "sexual act" is defined in 
SORMA as "an act of sexual penetration or an act of sexual violation". 
Sections 15 and 16 thus also criminalise all acts of sexual penetration and 
sexual violation committed by any person with a child below the age of 12 
years. In the latter instance the perpetrator will be guilty of rape, as the 
consent of the child in such an instance is regarded as invalid.18 Statutory 
rape in terms of section 15 stretches much further than merely sexual 
intercourse due to the much wider definition accorded to the term "sexual 
penetration" in the Act.19 Penetration can include penetration of the child's 
vagina, anus or mouth and penetration can also be performed with other 
parts of the body such as the fingers or toes or the genital organs of an 
animal or even objects such as sex toys.20 Section 15(2)(a) in its original 
form provided that if both parties concerned were children at the time of the 
commission of the crime, written authorisation to prosecute had to be given 
by the National Director of Public Prosecutions.21 
A specific anomaly which arose related to the situation where one of the 
parties was below the age of 16 years but the other was over the age of 16. 
In the latter instance only the older party would have been prosecuted.22 
Section 15 accordingly criminalised all consensual forms of sexual 
                                            
17  Smythe, Pithey and Artz Sexual Offences 9-10-9-11. 
18  Snyman Criminal Law (2014) 384. 
19  Smythe, Pithey and Artz Sexual Offences 9-11. 
20  Snyman Criminal Law (2014) 384-385. Sexual penetration in terms of the Act is 
defined as follows: 
"any act which causes penetration to any extent whatsoever by – 
(a) the genital organs of one person into or beyond the genital organs, anus, or 
mouth of another person; 
(b) any other part of the body of one person or, any object, including any part of the 
body of an animal, into or beyond the genital organs or anus of another person; 
(c) the genital organs of an animal, into or beyond the mouth of another person." 
21  Smythe, Pithey and Artz Sexual Offences 9-11; Snyman Criminal Law (2014) 384. 
Also see Minnie "Sexual Offences against Children" 550-551. 
22  Minnie "Sexual Offences against Children" 550. 
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penetration between adults and children as well as amongst children 
themselves. 
Section 16 criminalised all acts of sexual violation between adults and 
children as well as between children themselves. It is evident from the 
definition of "sexual violation" in the Act that it covers a wide spectrum of 
non-penetrative contact of a sexual nature.23 Smythe and Pithey correctly 
note that the wide definition of sexual violation seeks to protect children from 
12 to 16 years from adults who engage in these acts with children in 
circumstances where the children provide consent. The wide range of non-
penetrative acts, however, becomes highly problematic when they are 
committed between two consenting children.24 Research suggests that 
various biological changes that take place during puberty are considered to 
be the precipitating cause for increased sexual interest and behaviour 
amongst adolescents.25 
Like section 15, section 16(2)(a) also provided that where both parties were 
children, both had to be prosecuted, provided that the National Director of 
Public Prosecutions had authorised the prosecution in writing.26 
For the purposes of sections 15 and 16, defences were provided for in 
section 56(2) of the Act. Prior to its amendment section 56(2) read as 
follows: 
(2) Whenever an accused person is charged with an offence under – 
(a) section 15 or 16, it is, subject to subsection (3), a valid defence to 
such a charge to contend that the child deceived the accused 
person into believing that he or she was 16 years or older at the 
time of the alleged commission of the offence and the accused 
person reasonably believed that the child was 16 years or older; or 
(b) section 16, it is a valid defence to such a charge to contend that 
both the accused persons were children and the age difference 
between them was not more than two years at the time of the 
alleged commission of the offence. 
It is important to note that the "close in age" defence was available only 
where the child had been charged with statutory sexual assault, and 
accordingly not to a child who had been charged with statutory rape. This 
defence provided that it would be a valid defence for a child to submit that 
                                            
23  Smythe, Pithey and Artz Sexual Offences 9-17. 
24  Smythe, Pithey and Artz Sexual Offences 9-19. 
25  Smythe, Pithey and Artz Sexual Offences 9-18. 
26  Smythe, Pithey and Artz Sexual Offences 9-19; Minnie "Sexual Offences against 
Children" 551-553. 
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both the accused persons were children and that the age difference was not 
more than two years. 
Section 56(3) provides that these defences cannot be invoked if the 
accused person is related to the child within the prohibited degrees of blood, 
affinity or an adoptive relationship. The problematic aspect relating to the 
defence afforded to a charge of contravention of section 16 was that where 
the age difference between the children was more than two years it would 
inevitably have resulted in both children facing the possibility of prosecution. 
2.2 The Teddybear Judgment 
The salient facts appear from the judgment given by Rabie J in the North 
Gauteng High Court.27 The first applicant was the Teddy Bear Clinic for 
Abused Children, a non-profit company providing a full range of services to 
abused children, including forensic medical examinations, forensic 
psychological counselling, psychological assessments, play therapy, 
preparation for court appearances, and various programmes designed with 
the aim of diverting young sex offenders away from the criminal justice 
system. 
The second applicant was RAPCAN ("Resources Aimed at the Prevention 
of Child Abuse and Neglect"), also a non-profit company dedicated to the 
prevention of child victimisation and the promotion of children's rights. 
The first respondent was the Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and the second respondent was the National Director of 
Public Prosecutions. The three amici curiae who also participated were 
firstly the Women's Legal Centre Trust directed towards advancing and 
protecting the rights of all women and girls in South Africa and addressing 
the discrimination and disadvantage that women face; secondly the 
Tshwaranang Legal Advocacy Centre aimed at the promotion and 
protection of women's rights; and thirdly the Justice Alliance of South Africa 
aimed at upholding and developing Judaeo-Christian values. 
The applicants brought the application in pursuit of challenging the 
constitutional validity of certain sections of the Act and more specifically the 
constitutional validity of aspects pertaining to sections 15 and 16, and also 
56(2), which deals with defences in respect of sections 15 and 16. 
                                            
27  Also see Teddybear 2 paras 4-9, 25-27. 
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It was argued on behalf of the applicants that adolescents find themselves 
in peculiar situations in that physically they are developing and maturing 
rapidly but psychologically they remain vulnerable to the influence of adults. 
As such the applicants did not seek to challenge the provisions of sections 
15 and 16 as far as they criminalised sexual conduct by adults, but 
contended that as far as they criminalised the sexual conduct of children 
they were unconstitutional.28 The impugned provisions which were 
challenged were specifically those that criminalised sexual activity between 
children as well as the consequential reporting and registration of sex 
offender provisions.29 
The applicants argued that the criminalisation of acts of consensual sexual 
violation between adolescents where the age difference was more than two 
years violated their constitutional rights.30 A further important aspect raised 
by the applicants related to the National Register for Sex Offenders created 
in terms of chapter 6 of the Act. In terms of section 43 such a register 
contains the particulars of persons convicted of any sexual offence against 
a child or a person who is mentally disabled, or persons who are alleged to 
have committed a sexual offence against a child or a mentally disabled 
person.31 
It was further submitted that sections 15 and 16 should be assessed in 
conjunction with the provisions of section 54(1) of the Act, which provides 
that a person who has knowledge that a sexual offence has been committed 
against a child must report such knowledge immediately to a police official, 
and failure to do so constitutes an offence for which the person is liable upon 
conviction to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years or 
both a fine and such imprisonment. This section inadvertently also applies 
to the consensual offences criminalised in terms of sections 15 and 16.32 
Expert opinion by relevant experts concluded that intimate relationships 
between adolescents are developmentally normative and that it is usually 
within these intimate relationships that adolescents begin to explore a wide 
range of sexual behaviours such as kissing, petting, oral sex, vaginal 
intercourse and even anal intercourse.33 
                                            
28  Teddybear 1 para 24. 
29  Teddybear 1 para 24. 
30  Teddybear 1 para 38. 
31  Teddybear 1 para 42. 
32  Teddybear 1 para 44. 
33  Teddybear 1 para 49. 
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The experts also submitted that the criminalisation of consensual sexual 
acts limits the ability of support organisations to educate, empower and 
support adolescents in their sexual development. Despite the discretion 
afforded to the National Director of Public Prosecutions as to whether or not 
to prosecute as well as the process of diversion for child offenders, the 
reality remains that even if the children are not ultimately prosecuted for 
sections 15 and 16 offences, the children will still be subjected to the initial 
stages of the criminal justice system, which can include arrest, providing 
detailed statements, questioning by the police, appearance at the 
preliminary enquiry, and the possibility of detention. Even if the child is 
diverted, he or she would still be regarded as a sex offender and would have 
to admit responsibility for the sections 15 and 16 offences. 
The respondents' main argument in opposition to the application by the 
applicants was that the impugned provisions did not violate any 
constitutional rights of children. The respondents also specifically 
contended that the provisions of section 15 and 16 had to be considered 
against the backdrop of the Children's Act 38 of 2005 as well as the Child 
Justice Act.34 It was held by Rabie J in the High Court that the impugned 
provisions constituted an unjustified invasion of control into the intimate and 
private sphere of children's personal relationships in such a way as to cause 
them great harm, and as such constituted a violation of section 28(2) of the 
Constitution, and stigmatised and degraded children on the grounds of their 
consensual sexual conduct.35 It was held that even in the absence of being 
prosecuted under sections 15 and 16, or where diversion takes place 
following a decision to prosecute, children would still endure considerable 
and substantial trauma as a result of being exposed to the earlier processes 
in the criminal justice system, such as arrest, statement-taking, police 
questioning and detention in police cells.36 
In addition, the system of diversion does not completely protect the potential 
child offender, as some of the consequences of this process include that the 
child may be arrested, taken to the police station, be required to sign 
warning statements, have to appear at a preliminary enquiry, have to be 
assessed by a probation officer whilst the parents are present and, more 
damagingly, the child has to acknowledge responsibility for the offence. It 
was held that there exists no legislation or other guidelines to assist the 
relevant official to decide which cases to prosecute, and the existence of 
                                            
34  Teddybear 1 para 62. 
35  Teddybear 1 paras 74, 77. 
36  Teddybear 1 para 85. 
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the discretion cannot save the constitutionality of these provisions.37 
Sections 15 and 16 were accordingly declared unconstitutional.38 
The matter was consequently referred to the Constitutional Court for the 
purpose of confirmation of the order granted by the High Court. In delivering 
judgment the Constitutional Court emphasised the vulnerability of children 
in society and held as follows per Khampepe J:39 
Children are precious members of our society and any law that affects them 
must have due regard to their vulnerability and their need for guidance. We 
have a duty to ensure that they receive the support and assistance that is 
necessary for their positive growth and development … We must be careful, 
however, to ensure that, in attempting to guide and protect children, our 
interventions do not expose them to harsh circumstances which can only have 
adverse effects on their development. 
From the outset the Constitutional Court emphasised that the matter did not 
deal with the question as to whether or not children should engage in sexual 
conduct, but rather whether it was constitutionally sound to subject children 
to criminal sanctions in order to prevent them from engaging in early sexual 
conduct.40 It was once again indicated by the applicants that the provisions 
infringed a range of constitutional rights of children, namely their rights to 
human dignity, privacy, and bodily and psychological integrity, as well as 
the principle of foregrounding the best interests of the child.41 
The Constitutional Court noted that the applicants challenged the said 
provisions on two bases, firstly that the sections were constitutionally invalid 
and could not be severed, and secondly, whilst it could be permissible to 
criminalise 16 and 17 year olds for engaging in consensual sexual acts with 
adolescents, the former should have available to them a "close in age" 
defence to reduce the harsh impact of such criminalisation.42 The 
applicants, however, did not challenge the legislative differentiation 
between different groups of children.43 The expert evidence presented, in 
addition, related only to the impact of the sections on adolescents. 
Accordingly the findings regarding the unjustifiable limitation of rights 
pertained to the constitutional rights of adolescents only.44 
                                            
37  Teddybear 1 para 92. 
38  Teddybear 1 para 125. 
39  Teddybear 2 para 1. 
40  Teddybear 2 para 3. 
41  Teddybear 2 para 29. 
42  Teddybear 2 para 50. 
43  Teddybear 2 para 51. 
44  Teddybear 2 para 51. 
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In terms of the impact of the criminalisation of consensual sexual conduct 
on the child's right to dignity, Khampepe stated the following:45 
It cannot be doubted that the criminalization of consensual sexual conduct is 
a form of stigmatization which is degrading and invasive. In the circumstances 
of this case, the human dignity of the adolescents targeted by the impugned 
provisions is clearly infringed. If one's consensual sexual choices are not 
respected by society, but are criminalized, an innate sense of self-worth will 
inevitably be diminished. Even when such criminal provisions are rarely 
enforced, their symbolic impact has a severe effect on the social lives and 
dignity of those targeted. … To my mind, therefore, the stigma attached to 
adolescents by the impugned provisions is manifest. The limitation of section 
10 of the Constitution is obvious and undeniable. 
It was further held that the stigma of criminalisation was further exacerbated 
by the provisions in the Act pertaining to the Register in terms of which the 
name of any person who commits an offence in terms of section 15 or 16 
must be entered into the Register.46 It was accordingly held that sections 15 
and 16 limited adolescents' rights to human dignity.47 With reference to 
adolescents' right to privacy, it was held that sections 15 and 16 related to 
the most intimate sphere of personal relationships as they permitted police 
officials, prosecutors and judicial officers to scrutinise and assume control 
over intimate relationships of adolescents, ultimately invading a deeply 
personal sphere of their lives.48 It was accordingly held that sections 15 and 
16 encroached upon adolescents' right to privacy.49 The Constitutional 
Court proceeded to analyse the impact of section 15 and 16 on the principle 
of the best interests of the child enshrined in section 28(2) of the 
Constitution. It was held that the existence and enforcement of the sexual 
offences provided for by sections 15 and 16 exacerbated the risk to 
adolescents by negating support structures to adolescents and ultimately 
preventing adolescents from seeking help.50 It was further held that the latter 
would result in an atmosphere in which adolescents would refrain from 
freely communicating about sexual interactions with parents and 
                                            
45  Teddybear 2 para 55. 
46  Teddybear 2 para 57. See also the discussion pertaining to the Register below. 
47  Teddybear 2 para 58. 
48  Teddybear 2 para 60. Also see National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Justice 1998 12 BCLR 1517 (CC) para 32, where the right to privacy was 
espoused as follows: "Privacy recognizes that we all have a right to a sphere of private 
intimacy and autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture human relationships 
without interference from the outside community. The way in which we give expression 
to our sexuality is at the core of this area of private intimacy. If, in expressing our 
sexuality, we act consensually and without harming one another, invasion of that 
precinct will be a breach of our privacy." 
49  Teddybear 2 para 64. 
50  Teddybear 2 para 72. 
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counsellors.51 The prospect of adolescents facing the risk of being exposed 
to the criminal justice process in terms of arrest, interrogation and even 
having to formally acknowledge responsibility for the offence, it was held, 
offended the principle of the best interest of the child.52 It was held that the 
existence of a prosecutorial discretion did not alleviate the 
unconstitutionality of these sections.53 Ultimately it was held that sections 
15 and 16 offended the best interest principle and had the effect of actually 
harming the adolescents they were intended to protect.54 After conducting 
a thorough analysis in terms of section 36 of the Constitution, it was held 
that the limitations imposed by sections 15 and 16 could not be justified in 
terms of section 36, and accordingly that these sections were 
unconstitutional in imposing criminal liability on adolescents for engaging in 
consensual sexual conduct.55 The Constitutional Court concluded by finding 
that the scope of the findings was limited to consensual sexual conduct 
between children and, in addition, that the findings of invalidity were limited 
to the extent to which sections 15 and 16 criminalised the conduct of 
adolescents between the ages of 12 and 16 years.56 The Constitutional 
Court accordingly held that sections 15 and 16 of the Act were inconsistent 
with the Constitution. In terms of the order Parliament was granted eighteen 
months to correct the defects in the Act. 
3 Reflections on the constitutionality of the register in 
respect of juvenile sex offenders 
Another recent development pertaining to sexual offences against children 
was the ruling on the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act dealing 
with the Register with reference to juvenile sex offenders. The latter related 
specifically to the constitutionality pertaining to the automatic inclusion of 
the names of child sex offenders in the Register. 
An important aspect of the provisions pertaining to the Register relates to 
section 50(2), which provides that a court which has convicted a person of 
a sexual offence against a child or a person who is mentally disabled must 
make an order that the particulars of such a person be included in the 
Register.57 
                                            
51  Teddybear 2 para 73. 
52  Teddybear 2 para 74. 
53  Teddybear 2 para 76. 
54  Teddybear 2 para 79. 
55  Teddybear 2 para 101. 
56  Teddybear 2 para 113. 
57  See ss 50(1) and (2) of the Act. 
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In J v NDPP the Constitutional Court was required to assess the 
constitutionality of the provisions relating to the Register, with specific 
reference to juvenile sex offenders. 
3.1 A brief overview of the provisions in the Act pertaining to the 
Register 
In order to comprehend the judgment under discussion, it is necessary to 
take a closer look at the context of the Register. Section 42 of SORMA 
provides for the establishment of the Register and in terms of this section it 
is incumbent upon the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
to designate a fit and proper person as the registrar of the Register.58 The 
object of the Register is to protect children and persons who are mentally 
disabled against sex offenders.59 Section 41 provides that a person who has 
been convicted of the commission of a sexual offence against a child or is 
alleged to have committed a sexual offence against a child and has been 
dealt with in terms of section 77(6) of 78(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act60 
and whose particulars have been entered in the Register may not be 
employed to work with children in any circumstances; hold any position in 
respect of his or her employment which places him or her in any position of 
authority, supervision or care of a child; or gain access to a child or places 
where children are present. A person may, in addition, not be granted a 
licence or be given approval to manage any business or entity in relation to 
the supervision of or care of a child or become a foster parent, kinship 
caregiver, temporary safe care-giver or adoptive parent of a child.61 The 
primary objective of the Register is to protect children and mentally disabled 
persons from sex offenders by recording the particulars of these sexual 
offenders and in response to their queries informing employers, licensing 
authorities and entities dealing with the care and adoption of children 
whether or not particular names appear in the Register. These sex offenders 
will be prohibited from employment or any activities where they would have 
responsibility for or access to children.62 
                                            
58  Smythe, Pithey and Artz Sexual Offences 17-15. 
59  It is to be noted that the Register in terms of the Act differs from the National Child 
Protection Register provided for in the Children's Act 38 of 2005 (hereinafter 
"Children's Act") as the Child Protection Register deals with abuse and neglect of 
children whereas the Register pertains specifically to sexual offences against children. 
See Smythe, Pithey and Artz Sexual Offences 17-3. 
60  Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the "CPA"). 
61  S 41(1)(c)-(d) of the Act. See also Smythe, Pithey and Artz Sexual Offences 17-11-
17-12. 
62  Smythe, Pithey and Artz Sexual Offences 17-18-17-19. See in general s 40 of the Act, 
where "employer", "licensing authority" and "relevant authority" are defined. 
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A particularly important section for the purpose of the present discussion is 
section 50 of SORMA. Section 50(1) inter alia reads as follows: 
The particulars of the following persons must be included in the 
Register: 
(a)  A person who in terms of this Act or any other law- 
(i) has been convicted of a sexual offence against a child or a 
person who is mentally disabled; 
(ii) is alleged to have committed a sexual offence against a child or 
a person who is mentally disabled in respect of whom a court has 
made a finding and given a direction in terms of section 77(6) or 
78(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977. 
Section 50(2)(a), in addition, reads as follows: 
A court that has in terms of this Act or any other law- 
(i) convicted a person of a sexual offence against a child or a person 
who is mentally disabled and, after sentence has been imposed by 
that court for such offence, in the presence of the convicted 
person, or … 
(ii) … must make an order that the particulars of the person be 
included in the Register.63 
It is clear from the wording of section 50(2)(a) that a court retains no 
discretion in terms of entering in the Register the particulars of a person who 
has been convicted in terms of the Act. The latter formed the cornerstone 
of the constitutional challenge to this section, with specific reference to 
juvenile sex offenders in the J v NDPP decision, which will be discussed 
below. 
3.2 S v IJ; J v NDPP 
The salient facts appear from the judgment given by Henney J. The matter 
was brought before the court as an automatic review in terms of section 
85(1)(a) of the Child Justice Act.64 The accused, fourteen years of age, was 
charged with three counts of rape in contravention of section 3 of SORMA 
in that he had raped three young boys, two of them six years of age and 
one of seven, by anally penetrating them. In addition he was charged with 
assault with the intent to do grievous bodily harm in that he had allegedly 
stabbed a twelve year-old girl with a knife. The accused pleaded guilty to all 
of the charges and was subsequently convicted in respect of all of them. In 
                                            
63  Section 51 of the Act deals specifically with the removal of the particulars of a person 
from the Register. Emphasis added. 
64  Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the "CJA"). 
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respect of the sexual offences, he was sentenced to five years' compulsory 
residence in Eureka, a Child and Youth Care Centre in terms of the 
provisions of section 76(1) of the CJA. In addition he was sentenced to three 
years' imprisonment after the completion of the five years' compulsory 
residence in terms of the provisions of section 76(3) of the CJA. In respect 
of the conviction of assault with the intent to do grievous bodily harm, he 
was sentenced to six months' imprisonment suspended for a period of three 
years on condition that he was not convicted of assault committed in the 
period of suspension. In addition to the sentence, an ancillary order in terms 
of section 50(2) of SORMA was made to the effect that the accused's name 
be entered in the Register. The question was raised by the high court with 
the regional magistrate and the Director of Public Prosecutions, Western 
Cape, whether it was competent for the court to make an order in terms of 
section 50(2) of SORMA if proper cognisance is taken of the provisions of 
subsections 2, 3 and 4 of the CJA as well as section 28 of the Constitution. 
It was argued on behalf of the accused that children are neither physically 
nor mentally on the same level as adults and should receive guidance and 
nurturing, and that special provision should be made for the rights of 
children.65 It was further argued that in terms of section 50(2) no discretion 
was afforded to a court to decline to make an order that the particulars of 
an accused be entered into the Register.66 These peremptory provisions, it 
was argued, seriously infringed upon the constitutional rights of children with 
specific reference to the right to dignity, the right to privacy, and the rights 
to fair labour practice and freedom of trade, occupation and profession.67 
These provisions, in addition, infringed section 28 of the Constitution 
protecting the best interests of the child and also violated the child's right to 
be protected from degradation and not to have his or her wellbeing and 
moral and social development placed at risk.68 It was further stated that child 
offenders should be placed in a different category from adult offenders, 
thereby acknowledging their unique and vulnerable position in society.69 It 
was argued that although the limitation of rights in the Constitution may be 
justifiable in respect of adult offenders, in terms of the limitations clause of 
section 36 of the Constitution, this was not the case in respect of child 
offenders with specific reference to section 28 of the Constitution.70 It was 
                                            
65  S v IJ para 52. 
66  S v IJ para 53. 
67  S v IJ para 55. 
68  S v IJ para 56. 
69  S v IJ para 57. 
70  S v IJ para 58. S 28(2) of the Constitution provides for the following: "A child's best 
interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child." 
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noted that the obligation of courts to include the particulars of a child 
offender failed to take note of the long-term effects of the inclusion on the 
child offender.71 It was argued that the absence of a discretion afforded to 
a judicial officer whether or not to order that the particulars of a child offender 
be entered or not flew in the face of the principles provided for in section 3 
of the CJA stipulating that the consequences arising from the commission 
of an offence should be proportionate to the circumstances of the child, the 
nature of the offence and the interests of society.72 It was stated that the 
limitation of the child offender's rights in these circumstances was not 
reasonable and justifiable in terms of the Constitution.73 
It was argued on behalf of the amicus curiae that the impugned provisions 
were overbroad in the sense that there are less restrictive means for 
achieving the purpose of the provisions, as a sexual offence for the 
purposes of section 50(2) could include every offence from rape to kissing.74 
The amicus curiae further emphasised that a conviction on more than one 
sexual offence (irrespective of its seriousness) rendered an offender's 
particulars to be entered in the Register for the rest of his or her life.75 On 
behalf of the Minister it was argued that the provisions of the impugned 
section that created the Register are intended to protect children from 
sexual predators.76 It was argued that the inclusion of an accused's 
particulars in the Register cannot reasonably be said to constitute an 
infringement of his or her right to dignity as the contents of the Register are 
not for public consumption.77 It was stated that the inclusion of the accused's 
particulars in the Register does not fall short of the reconciliatory approach 
provided for in the CJA and it does not offend any provisions of the 
Children's Act.78 
In delivering judgment Henney J firstly emphasised the fact that the court 
was dealing with a child offender and that such an offender had to be dealt 
with in terms of the provisions of the CJA.79 It was held that the purpose of 
the CJA, in accordance with the underlying values of the Constitution, is to 
grant special protection to children who commit criminal offences.80 It was 
                                            
71  S v IJ para 59. 
72  S v IJ para 60. 
73  S v IJ para 64. 
74  S v IJ para 79. 
75  S v IJ para 81. 
76  S v IJ para 83. 
77  S v IJ para 85. 
78  S v IJ para 87. 
79  S v IJ para 94. 
80  S v IJ para 96. 
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held that with regard to the legitimate and constitutional purpose that 
SORMA seeks to protect, namely the protection of the dignity, freedom and 
physical integrity of women and children as vulnerable groups, the inclusion 
per se of the particulars of an offender who commits a sexual offence 
against a child constitutes a limitation that is reasonable and justifiable.81 
It was held that the lack of discretion granted to the presiding official together 
with the over broadness of offences falling under the term "sexual offence" 
means that the courts cannot take the particular circumstances into account: 
whether the child poses a threat to other children and whether the 
circumstances justify such an approach.82 Henney J expressed concern in 
respect of section 50(2)'s not affording a sexual offender an opportunity to 
make representations to persuade a court not to make an order that his or 
her particulars be placed on the Register. It was held that the latter violates 
an offender's right to a fair hearing and the principle of audi alteram 
partem.83 It was held that the failure to afford an offender the right to be 
heard before an order was made in terms of section 50(2) was not a 
reasonable and justifiable limitation of the rights of a sexual offender in order 
to protect the dignity, freedom and physical integrity of children.84 It was 
stated by the court that section 50(2) offended against a person's right to a 
fair hearing by not allowing the court a discretion to consider whether or not 
an order should be made. Henney J accordingly held as follows:85 
… s 50(2) should be declared unconstitutional and invalid only to the extent 
that a presiding officer is not allowed a discretion whether or not to make such 
an order, and that an offender is not given an opportunity to make 
representations before such an order is made. This limitation of the right to a 
fair hearing cannot be justified. To this extent only, I hold that the provisions 
of s 50(2) are invalid and inconsistent with the Constitution. 
The matter was consequently referred to the Constitutional Court for 
confirmation of the order granted by the High Court. 
In delivering judgment the Constitutional Court pertinently emphasised the 
adverse consequences flowing from having a person's details entered into 
the register as discussed above.86 The Constitutional Court had to consider 
specifically whether the order of constitutional invalidity should apply to both 
child and adult offenders. It was held, however, that the facts before the 
                                            
81  S v IJ para 111. 
82  S v IJ para 122. 
83  S v IJ para 126. Also see De Beer v North-Central Local Council and South-Central 
Local Council 2002 1 SA 429 (CC) para 11. 
84  S v IJ para 130. 
85  S v IJ para 134-137. 
86  See J v NDPP paras 20-25. 
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High Court dealt with the application of the provision to child offenders and 
that different considerations could apply to adult offenders, which had 
neither been canvassed before the court nor argued, and as such it was 
held that it would not be in the interests of justice for the Constitutional Court 
to make findings pertaining to the provision's application to adult 
offenders.87 It was further held that the ambit of the order of invalidity 
pertained to section 50(2)(a) only, to the exclusion of section 50(2)(b).88 
The state respondents argued that although the purpose behind section 
50(2)(a) was constitutional, the section did not allow for an individual 
approach and conceded that "individualised justice is required to avert 
injustice".89 The amici curiae argued that the section infringed the principle 
of the best interests of child as enshrined in section 28(2) of the 
Constitution.90 It was held that the starting point in all matters concerning 
the child is section 28(2).91 The latter was canvassed by Skweyiya ADCJ in 
stating:92 
The contemporary foundations of children's rights and the best-interests 
principle encapsulate the idea that the child is a developing being, capable of 
change and in need of appropriate nurturing to enable her to determine herself 
to the fullest extent and to develop her moral compass. 
It was further held that certain principles flow from the approach of the best 
interests of the child, which include firstly that the law should generally 
distinguish between adults and children. The latter principle highlights the 
intrinsic defect in section 50(2)(a), which fails to draw a distinction between 
adult and child offenders. Secondly the law should provide for an 
individuated approach to children, catering for individual circumstances, in 
order to secure the best interests of a particular child. Thirdly, the child or 
her representatives must be afforded an appropriate and adequate 
opportunity to render recommendations and to be heard at every stage of 
the process with due regard to the age and maturity of the child.93 
                                            
87  See J v NDPP para 31. 
88  See J v NDPP para 32. 
89  See J v NDPP para 34. 
90  J v NDPP para 35. 
91  J v NDPP para 35. 
92  J v NDPP para 36. 
93  J v NDPP paras 37-40. 
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It was held that section 50 of SORMA left a court with no discretion whether 
or not to include an offender's particulars on the Register.94 It was held by 
Skweyiya ADCJ as follows:95 
The provision requires that registration follows automatically from conviction 
of and sentencing for the particular crimes. This infringes the best interests of 
the child. The opportunity for an individuated response to the particular child 
offender, taking into account the child's representations and views, is 
excluded both at the point of registration and in the absence of an opportunity 
for review. The limited circumstances in which an offender can apply for his 
or her removal from the Register are insufficiently flexible to consider the 
particular child's development or reform. 
With reference to the serious consequences of being placed on the 
Register, it was held that such consequences which flow from the provision 
may not always affect the child offender whilst he or she is still a child, but 
may do so later in adulthood.96 Skweyiya ADCJ held as follows:97 
Child offenders who have served their sentences will remain tarred with the 
sanction of exclusion from areas of life and livelihood that may be formative 
of their personal dignity, family life, and abilities to pursue a living. An 
important factor in realising the reformative aims of child justice is for child 
offenders to be afforded an appropriate opportunity to be reintegrated into 
society. … Given that a child's moral landscape is still capable of being 
shaped, the compulsory registration of the child sex offender in all 
circumstances is an infringement of the best interests principle. 
It was accordingly held that the provision limited a child offender's right in 
terms of section 28(2) of the Constitution. 
It was held that the limitation of the rights of child offenders contained in 
section 50(2)(a) was not justified in an open and democratic society and 
therefore that section 50(2)(a) was constitutionally invalid to the extent that 
it unjustifiably limited the right of child sex offenders to have their best 
interests considered of paramount importance. It was further held that the 
declaration of invalidity should be suspended for a period of 15 months from 
the date of the order in order to afford Parliament the opportunity to correct 
the defect.98 
                                            
94  J v NDPP para 41. 
95  J v NDPP para 42. 
96  J v NDPP para 43. 
97  J v NDPP para 44. 
98  J v NDPP para 57. 
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4 Changes brought about by the Amendment Act 
In order to effectively address the issues raised in the Teddybear and J 
decisions, the Amendment Act was drafted and officially commenced on 7 
July 2015. The preamble to the Amendment Act states that the object of the 
Amendment Act is: 
… to ensure that children of certain ages are not held criminally liable for 
engaging in consensual sexual acts with each other … to give presiding 
officers a discretion in order to decide in individual cases whether the 
particulars of children should be included in the National Register for Sex 
offenders or not …  
According to the Amendment Act a child is now defined as a person under 
the age of eighteen years.99 
In order to address the concerns in the Teddybear decision, section 15 was 
amended to read as follows:100 
(1) A person ('A') who commits an act of sexual penetration with a child 
('B') who is 12 years of age or older but under the age of 16 years is, 
despite the consent of B to the commission of such an act, guilty of the 
offence of having committed an act of consensual sexual penetration 
with a child, unless A, at the time of the alleged commission of such an 
act, was – 
(a) 12 years of age or older but under the age of 16 years; or 
(b) Either 16 or 17 years of age and the age difference between A and B 
was not more than two years. 
(2) 
(a) The institution of a prosecution for an offence referred to in subsection 
(1) must be authorised in writing by the Director of Public Prosecutions 
if A was either 16 or 17 years of age at the time of the alleged 
commission of the offence and the age difference between A and B was 
more than two years. 
(b) The Director of Public Prosecutions concerned may delegate his or her 
power to decide whether a prosecution should be instituted or not. 
The most significant development in terms of the Amendment Act is that 
children between the ages of 12 and 15 can no longer be prosecuted for 
engaging in consensual sexual penetration. Children aged 16 or 17 can 
similarly not be prosecuted for engaging in consensual sexual acts of 
penetration with children below the age of 16, provided that the age 
difference between them is not more than two years. The "close in age" 
defence which existed previously in terms of section 16 only is now 
incorporated in section 15, although it does not operate as a defence, as in 
                                            
99  See s 1 of the Amendment Act. 
100  See ss 15 and 16 of the Amendment Act. 
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these cases the children will not have committed an offence. Children aged 
16 or 17 who engage in consensual sexual penetration with children below 
the age of 16, where the age difference is more than two years, can be 
prosecuted in terms of section 15. The discretion to prosecute lies with the 
Director of Public Prosecutions. The position in respect of 16 and 17 year-
old children has accordingly vastly improved compared to the original 
wording of sections 15 and 16 of the Act. Previously 16 and 17 year-olds 
had to be prosecuted if they engaged in consensual sexual activity with 
other adolescents. The Director of Public Prosecutions now has a discretion 
to prosecute 16 or 17 year-old children where the age difference between 
them and the younger child was more than two years. The Amendment Act 
has not changed the position pertaining to adults having consensual sexual 
penetration with children, where the adult will still be prosecuted. 
Section 16 was amended to read as follows: 
(1) A person ("'A"') who commits an act of sexual violation with a child 
("'B"') who is 12 years of age or older but under the age of 16 years 
is, despite the consent of B to the commission of such an act, guilty 
of the offence of having committed an act of consensual sexual 
violation with a child, unless A, at the time of the alleged commission 
of such an act, was 
(a) 12 years of age or older but under the age of 16 years; or 
(b) Either 16 or 17 years of age and the age difference between A 
and B was not more than two years; 
(2) 
(a) The institution of a prosecution for an offence referred to in 
subsection (1) must be authorised in writing by the relevant 
Director of Public Prosecutions if A was either 16 or 17 years of 
age at the time of the alleged commission of the offence and the 
age difference between A and B was more than two years; 
(b) The Director of Public Prosecutions concerned may delegate his 
or her power to decide whether a prosecution in terms of this 
section should be instituted or not. 
Like the situation in section 15 as discussed above, children between the 
ages of 12 and 15 can no longer be prosecuted for engaging in acts of 
consensual sexual violation. Children aged 16 or 17 can similarly not be 
prosecuted for engaging in acts of consensual sexual violation with children 
below the age of 16, provided that the age difference between them is not 
more than two years. Accordingly, children who are aged 16 or 17 and who 
engage in acts of consensual sexual violation with children below the age 
of 16 and where the age difference is more than two years can be 
prosecuted in terms of section 16. The Director of Public Prosecutions has 
a discretion as to whether or not to prosecute in such circumstances. The 
position pertaining to adults committing acts of consensual sexual violation 
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with children remains unchanged and the adult in those circumstances will 
be prosecuted. 
The constitutional issues raised in the J decision were addressed and 
resulted in the amendment inter alia of section 50. Section 50(2)(a) still 
provides for the mandatory entering of a person's details in the Register 
where such a person was convicted of a sexual offence against a child or a 
mentally disabled person, or where a finding was made that the person was 
either not fit to stand trial or criminally responsible for the act which 
constituted a sexual offence against a child or mentally disable person, 
subject to paragraph C of the particular section. Paragraph C, which now 
reads directly after section 50(2)(b), now provides as follows: 
(c) If a court has, in terms of this Act or any other law, convicted a person 
("'A"') of a sexual offence referred to in paragraph (a)(i) and A was a 
child at the time of the commission of such offence, or if a court has 
made a finding and given a direction referred to in paragraph (a)(ii) in 
respect of A who was a child at the time of the alleged commission of 
the offence, the court may not make an order as contemplated in 
paragraph (a) unless – 
(i) the prosecutor has made an application to the court for such an 
order; 
(ii) the court has considered a report by the probation officer referred 
to in section 71 of the Child Justice Act, 2008, which deals with 
the probability of A committing another sexual offence against a 
child or a person who is mentally disabled, as the case may be, 
in future; 
(iii) A has been given the opportunity to address the court as to why 
his or her particulars should not be included in the Register; and 
(iv) the court is satisfied that substantial and compelling 
circumstances exist based upon such report and any other 
evidence, which justify the making of such an order. 
(d) In the event that a court finds that substantial and compelling 
circumstances exist which justify the making of an order as 
contemplated in paragraph (a), the court must enter such 
circumstances on the record of the proceedings. 
Section 50 accordingly now grants a court a discretion whether or not to 
enter juvenile sex offenders' particulars into the Register. Accordingly, there 
is a general prohibition in terms of the entering of juvenile sex offenders' 
particulars into the Register, unless the conditions provided for in the section 
are complied with. The Amendment Act, in addition, provides for the 
inclusion under section 51(2) of the provisions of (2A), which inclusion 
essentially provides an opportunity for juvenile sex offenders convicted prior 
to the commencement of the Amendment Act and whose particulars have 
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been recorded in the Register to apply to a court to have his or her 
particulars removed.101 
5 Assessment 
From a purely constitutional perspective, the judgments in both Teddybear 
and J v NDPP were a welcome response to the exposure of the inherent 
flaws in the Act, paving the way for a more constitutionally sound approach, 
which eventuated in the enactment of the Amendment Act. Both decisions 
essentially centred on the principle of the best interests of the child which, 
in all matters concerning the rights of the child, remains paramount.102 The 
judgments underscored the child's basic rights to dignity, privacy, 
psychological and bodily integrity, and the right not to be treated or punished 
in a cruel, inhuman or degrading manner.103 Sections 15 and 16 in their 
original form criminalised consensual sexual activity between adolescents. 
This not only impacted on the way in which adolescents viewed their own 
sexual exploration and development, but it further inevitably resulted in 
adolescents' potentially facing the harsh realities of the criminal justice 
system and being exposed thereto. Adolescents also faced the possibility 
being convicted of a sexual offence in terms of the Act and having their 
details recorded in the Register. A further anomaly flowed from the fact that 
in respect of section 54 of the Act an obligation was imposed on any person 
who had knowledge that a sexual offence had been committed against a 
child to report such knowledge immediately to the police, failing which that 
person was guilty of an offence.104 Accordingly, a child who for whatever 
reason discussed his or her sexual experience with a parent or care-giver, 
for example,  would inevitably precipitate a situation in which the parent or 
caregiver have an obligation to report the sexual activity or face prosecution 
in terms of section 54. Section 15 and 16 also did not cater for any protection 
or defences for children who were 16 and 17 years old. No discretion in the 
matter of prosecution was afforded to the Director of Public Prosecutions in 
respect of 16 and 17 year-old adolescents. As a result of the Teddybear 
decision, these problematic issues have been addressed. Adolescents 
                                            
101  See s 8 of the Amendment Act. 
102  Also see Davel and Skelton Commentary on the Children's Act 2-5-2-10; Clark 2000 
Stell LR 3-20; Muller and Jaff 1999 De Jure 322-329. 
103  These fundamental rights of all people, including children, are well established in 
terms of the Constitution s 10, which provides the right to human dignity; s 14, which 
deals with the right to privacy; and s 12, which deals with the freedom and security of 
the person. S 28(2), in addition, provides that the best interest of the child remain 
paramount in every matter concerning a child. Also see Currie and De Waal Bill of 
Rights Handbook 210; 250-268; 269-286. 
104  Sections 54(1)(a) and (b). 
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between the ages of 12 and 15 will not be criminally liable for engaging in 
consensual sexual conduct. Despite the fact that 16 and 17 year-old 
adolescents did not form part of the submissions in the Teddybear decision, 
the legislator addressed this particular age category by providing that 16 
and 17 year old adolescents will not be criminally liable for engaging in 
consensual sexual conduct with children younger than 16, provided that the 
age difference between them is not more than two years. In the event that 
the age difference is more than two years, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions retains a discretion to prosecute. The latter is undoubtedly a 
huge advancement over the original position. It remains to be seen if the 
prosecution of 16 and 17 year-old adolescents will form the basis of a further 
constitutional challenge in future. If so, it could be argued that all 
adolescents below the age of 18 years should be free from prosecution 
where they engaged in consensual sexual conduct. The judgment in the 
Teddybear decision acknowledges to a large extent the reality that 
adolescents are autonomous beings who should be afforded the right to 
sexual autonomy. This is part of a child's inherent right to be treated as an 
equal and to have his or her autonomy respected.105 Research on 
adolescent teenage sexual behaviour clearly suggests that sexual 
exploration is a normal and expected component of development.106 
Criminalising consensual sexual acts between adolescents could be 
severely detrimental to children, infringing not only their' right to freedom of 
choice of lifestyle and social interactions, but also their developmental 
interests to enter adulthood free from prejudice and stigmatisation.107 The 
decriminalisation of these actions was a welcoming response to the 
requirement that adolescents' best interests should be protected in 
situations where they engage in consensual sexual activity. Stone 
encapsulates the distinction to be made in this situation by stating:108 
While one may be morally opposed to two teenagers having sexual relations 
with each other, 'sex' is not the proper area for expansive legislation on 
morality. There is a fine line between immorality and criminality. 
The judgment in J v NDPP proclaimed the unconstitutionality of the 
provisions of the Register pertaining to juvenile sex offenders. One of the 
primary aims of the Act with the establishment of the Register was clearly 
to protect children and mentally disabled persons, as vulnerable groups in 
society, against sexual predators. The reality is, however, that child sex 
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offenders will inevitably also fall into the category of persons whose names 
and details should be entered into the Register, should they commit sexual 
offences against children. 
In both the judgment delivered by the High Court as well as that delivered 
by the Constitutional Court, the inherent unconstitutionality of section 
50(2)(a) was proclaimed. It is notable, however, that in the judgment of the 
High Court the unconstitutionality was pertinently traced to section 
50(2)(a)'s not affording child sex offenders an opportunity of making 
representations as to why their particulars should not be placed on the 
Register. In the Constitutional Court judgment the inherent 
unconstitutionality is taken a step further in the sense of not providing for an 
individuated approach in respect of juvenile sex offenders. The latter 
response by the Constitutional Court is welcomed, as the paramountcy of 
the principle of the best interests of the child was once again affirmed and 
emphasised. It could further be argued that such an approach provides for 
a more holistic and multifaceted approach when dealing with juvenile sex 
offenders. The amendment to section 50 as provided for in the Amendment 
Act is to be welcomed, as it provides for a more holistic approach when 
dealing with juvenile sex offenders. A question which inevitably arises is 
whether or not the Register is desirable in respect of juvenile sex offenders. 
It was indicated above that the consequences of having one's details 
entered into the Register are extremely harsh. "Sexual violation", for 
example, is defined in such a wide manner in the Act that it could include 
acts ranging from mere kissing or hugging to touching another person's 
genital organs. And if a child commits two acts of sexual violation and is 
convicted as a result thereof, he or she faces the danger of his or her 
particulars never being removed from the Register. Is the latter really in the 
best interest of children? It almost seems as though the objects of the CJA 
and SORMA are often not in line with one another. The J v NDPP decision 
and ultimately the Amendment Act indeed paved the way for a more 
constitutional approach in respect of the process followed, by affording the 
offender the right to make representations as to why his or her name should 
not be entered into the Register. The latter does, however, not relieve the 
uneasiness in terms of juvenile sex offenders and the risk they face in terms 
of the consequences of the Register. 
The question arises as to whether the Register serves any rehabilitative 
function in respect of juvenile offenders. Even if a juvenile sex offender has 
the opportunity to show good cause as to why his or her details should not 
be entered into the Register, the possibility still exists that the court could 
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rule that good cause had not been shown and that his or her details should 
appear in the Register. 
The juvenile sex offender would thus be classified amongst the worst class 
of offenders. It is submitted that by making the provisions of the Register 
applicable to juvenile sex offenders, sight is lost of the essential differences 
between adult and juvenile sex offenders, as well as of the objects of the 
CJA as described above. Research suggests that juvenile sex offenders 
have a generally lower overall recidivism rate for sexual offences than adult 
sex offenders.109 Juvenile sex offenders, in addition, show lower recidivism 
rates than adult sex offenders when placed in treatment and rehabilitation 
programmes specifically tailored for juvenile offenders.  
Research indicates that juvenile sex offenders also have more potential for 
rehabilitation.110 The general patterns of behaviour of juvenile sex offenders 
seem to be less embedded than those found in adult sex offenders.111 The 
sexual behaviour of adult sex offenders tends to be a symptom of deeply 
ingrained pathology, whereas juvenile sex offenders appear to be more 
exploratory in their sexual behaviours. Juvenile sex offenders, in addition, 
tend to be more receptive to treatment programmes. Juvenile sex offenders 
also tend to commit sexual offences of a less serious and aggressive nature 
than adults do.112 According to research, juvenile sex offenders have proven 
to be less likely to resort to aggressive behaviour, have significantly lower 
recidivism rates, and are more amendable to treatment and rehabilitation 
programmes.113 
It is notable that section 40 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child114 
requires age-appropriate proceedings for juvenile offenders. Children 
should accordingly be treated in such a way as to promote their dignity as 
well as their reintegration into society, having regard to the specific 
circumstances of the offence. In terms of the latter, children should be 
placed on the Register only if they pose a demonstrable risk and danger to 
the community. 
The Amendment Act now provides for various safeguards in terms of 
assessing whether or not to enter a particular juvenile offender's particulars 
into the Register. Most importantly, the juvenile is now afforded the 
                                            
109  Geer 2008 Dev Mental Health L 33-52. 
110  Geer 2008 Dev Mental Health L 41. 
111  Geer 2008 Dev Mental Health L 41. 
112  Geer 2008 Dev Mental Health L 41. 
113  Geer 2008 Dev Mental Health L 42. 
114  Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). 
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opportunity to address the court as to why his or her particulars should not 
be entered. This corresponds to a large extent with the Constitutional Court 
judgment in J v NDPP, where emphasis was placed on an individuated 
response which should be applied in cases of juvenile sex offenders, having 
due regard to each juvenile sex offender as an individual. 
It is submitted that when dealing with juvenile sex offenders it is essential to 
follow an individualistic approach. It is submitted that within the framework 
of the Amendment Act juvenile sex offenders should also be assessed by 
qualified mental health experts in order to specifically assess the potential 
risk and danger of the offender to the community, and the possibility of 
rehabilitation and reintegration. The latter could be provided for within the 
ambit of the address to the court as to why the individual's details should 
not be recorded in the Register. The latter by no means detracts from the 
fact that the offences of juvenile sex offenders should be taken seriously. It 
merely ensures that a holistic approach is followed when dealing with 
juvenile sex offenders. 
6 Conclusion 
This contribution dealt essentially with recent developments in sexual 
offences against children. The Constitutional Court in Teddybear and J v 
NDPP paved the way for transforming the Act in line with constitutional 
values and principles ultimately underscoring the principle of the best 
interests of the child. In response to these two judgments the Amendment 
Act was enacted and officially commenced. The provisions of the 
Amendment Act radically revised the provisions challenged constitutionally 
in the two Constitutional Court judgments, ultimately aligning them with the 
values and principles enshrined in the Constitution. What becomes clear 
from the discussion is that children and ultimately juvenile offenders are a 
vulnerable group in society requiring an individualised approach. In 
conclusion, the dictum by the Constitutional Court in S v M115 comes to 
mind, where it was held: 
A truly principled child-centred approach requires a close and individualised 
examination of the precise real-life situation of the particular child involved. To 
apply a predetermined formula for the sake of certainty, irrespective of the 
circumstances, would in fact be contrary to the best interests of the child 
concerned. 
  
                                            
115  S v M 2007 2 BCLR 1312 (CC) para 37. 
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